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Immigration Reform and U.S. Employment Policy
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Cornell University
"Its death is a classic symptom of the problem with our politics; the
special interest prevails over the general interest!,l With this grim epitaph
one Congressman summed up the political fate of the immigration reform package
that had just died in a conference committee in October, 1984. The legisla-
tion, popularly known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, represented the latest
unsuccessful attempt of a quest that began in the early 1970s by Congress to
come to grips with the nation's unguided and massively abused inmigration
2
system.
Even the Simpson-Mazzoli bill did not represent a panacea for .the correc-
tion of nation's immigration policy ills. Its passage would have constituted
only a first step in a reform effort designed to make the nation's immigration
system consistent with other economic policies designed to pursue full employ-
ment and to develop the employment potential of the nation's available human
resources. For although the Simpson-Mazzoli bill contained other features,
it was primarily addressed at illegal immigration. As important as is the
resolution of ' this issue, it is a fundamental error to assume that mass abuse
is the only serious problem with the nation's immigration system. It is only
the most obvious symptom that something is seriously wrong. The defeat of this
"bill -- which, incidentally~ the noted authority on. immigration history, Oscar
Handlin, described as being "a more liberal measure than any we've had in 90
3yea rs II
-- means that the enti re refonn movement is back to square one.
The Policy Bifurcation
A nation can only acquire its labor force in two ways: people who are
born withi n its boundal'i es come of worki ng age Or other persons immigrate
'I
2from other nations. Through-out most of the 19th and early 20th Century,
immigration was the most important component of the nation's human resource
po1i cy. The imposition of the nation's first numerical ceilings on immigra-
tion in the 1920s were followed by several decades of depression, war, and
their aftermaths. As a consequence, immigration diminished significantly in
terms of its human resource importance over the lengthy period from the late
1920s to the mid-1960s. Accordingly, many scholars and po1icymakers have been
slow to recognize that since the mid-1960s, immigration -- in all of its
diverse forms -- has slowly but steadily reemerged as a major feature of the
U.S. economy. In many regards, the nation's political system is better able
to respond to sudden, but highly insignificant, claps of thunder than to slow,
but methodical, changes in the barometric readings of its economic indicators.
The 1980 Census revealed that the size .of the nation's foreign-born
population had not only reversed its long downward decline but it had also
sustained a quantum increase. As a group, they had increased from 9.6 million
in 1970 to 13.9 million pers~ns in 1980 after havi.ng declined in numbers during
eqch previous decade since 1920. It also disclosed that one of every 10 people
in the country spoke a language other than English at home. As it is certain
that there was a substantial statistical undercount of the illegal immigration
population by the 1980 ~ensus, even t~ese data findings are surely understated.
Aware of this development as well as others, the noted demographer Leon
Bouvier observed in 1981 that "immigration now appears to be almost as im-
portant~s fertility insofaias U.S. population gro~this concerned."4 As the
labor force is the principal means by which population ch~nges are transmitted
."
to the nation's economy, Bouvier warned that "there is a compelling argument
for close co-ordination between the formulation of employment and immigration
policy. liS Recognizing this critical linkage and moving to correct this
3bifurcation should be the underlying rationale for immigration reform in the
mid-1980s. It is the thesis of this paper.
Immigration has significant economic implications for both the partic-
ipants and the receiving society. It can determine labor force trends as
well as respond to them. For this reason, the efficacy of policies that
regulate immigration must be judged in terms ~f how congruent they are with
the nation's labor force needs at any particular time. Any cursory review
of contemporary U.S. immigration policy will show vividly that not only does
it fail to meet this minimumstandard of commonsense but, in fact, it actually
works at cross purposes to the accomplishment of this goal.
The Perverse Influence of Administrative Structure
Because the magnitude and composition of immigration flows are supposedly
subject to direct government regulation, it is essential to understand how
the policy making process functions. There is only tangential mention of
immigration in the Constitution. By the late Nineteenth Century, however,
the Supreme Court had concluded that the federal government was the exclusive
governmental body to assume this responsibility.6 After a brief assignment
of power to the Department of the Treasury and later to the Department of
. Commerce and Labor, the administration of immigration policy was shifted to
the newly established D.s. Department of Labor (DOL) in 1914. This action
represented a clear recognition. by policymakers of the time that labor market
considerations should be a primary concern, in the administration of immigration
policy. In 1933, by executive order, the immigration and the naturalization
functions (which had been separately administered in DOL) were joined into
4agency -- the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The INS has con-
tinued ever since to be responsible for the implementation of immigration
policy.
With the recognition in 1940 of the likely involvement of the United
States in World War II, a critical decision was made that has had lasting
influence on the course of immigration policy. In June, 1940, the INS was
shifted from DOLto the U.S. Department of Justic~. Ostensibly, the shift
was necessary for national security reasons. Concern over the possible entry
and presence of subversive foreign elements in the population was elevated
to the highest priority mission of the agency. Labor market considerations
were shunted aside.
Whenthe war ended, the INS remained in the Department of Justice. The
long run effects of this administrative change have been disastrous to efforts
to build a coherent immigration policy -- especially if one of the concerns
is that immigration policy should seek congruence with domestic labor market
developments. The Department of Justice has multiple responsibilities and,
when compared to its numerous other important duties, immigration matters
have tended to be neglected or relegated to a low order of priority. Moreover,
the Department of Justice is one of the most politically sensitive agencies
in the federal government. It often opts for short run expedient solutions.
It has seldom manifested any interest in the economic aspects and consequences
of immigration. Indicative of this disinterest is the fact that there has
been virtually no support by the Department of Justice over the years for
independent research to study the consequences of the various immigration
policies it administers. If it were not for research sponsored by the U.S.
Department of Labor and by various private foundations in the 1970s, far
5less would be known today than the scant information that does exist con-
cerning this vital area of public policy.
Another lasting effect of the shift of immigration policy to the Justice
Department has been that .the two judiciary committees of Congress gained the
responsibility for supervision over immigration in general and the INS in
particular. Traditionally, membership on these committees has been reserved
(often exclusively) for lawyers. The result, as noted by David North and
Allen LeBel, is that lias immigration problems arise, be they major or minor,
perceived or real, the response of lawyer-legislators is that the law should
be changed. II] As a consequence, immigration law in the United States has
become obsessively complex and legalistic. In addition to the statutory
laws, INS operations are also governed by more than 5,000 pages of written
rules. The primary result of these developments has been to create a "honey
pot" for the nation's legal community. In no way can it be said that the
nation has an immigration system that is accountable for its economic impact.
.The Nature of the Existing Immigration System
Before discussing the maleficent consequences of the extant immigration
system, it is necessary to outline the current system. To do this, it is
necessary to look at the major policy components -- those that pertain to
legal immigration, refugees, asylees, and illegal immigration. For the sa ke
of brevity, I am not going to discuss the troubled topics of nonimmigrant
labor policy or of border commuter labor policy which are also part of this
overall system and which are both also in a stat~ of disarray.8
Legal immigration policy
The revival of legal immigration as an influential force can be virtually
dated to the passage of the Immigtation Act of 1965. It represented the
6culmination of decades of efforts to purge the nation's immigration system
of the overt racism that had been the central focus of the "nationa1 origins
system" that was adopted in 1924. After years of active struggle, the Civil
Rights movement achieved its capstone goal -- the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Just as overt racism could no longer be tolerated in the way
citizens were treated by fellow citizens, netther could racism be practiced
by the laws that govern the way in which non-citizens were considered for
immigrant admission.
The restrictive features of the era of the "nationa1 origins system'l
had done more than shape the racial and ethnic composition of immigrant flows.
It had sharply distorted the total flow.
.
Some nations with large quotas
(e.g., Great Britain which was entitled to about 40 percent of all of the
available visa$) did not use all of the slots available to it while other
nations (e.g., Italy and Greece) with small quotas had massive backlogs of
would-be immigrants. Hence, during the years 1952 to 1965, only 61 percent
of the available quotas wer~ a~tua11y used despit~ the fact that tens of
tnousands of persons were precluded from admission, Succeeding administrations
in the post-World War II era were forced, therefore, to seek ad hoc legislation
and to use parole powers given to the Attorney General to admit hundreds of
thousands of refugees for both humanftarian and national interest considerations.
As a consequence, one of every three persons admitted to the United States
from 1952 to 1965 entered outside the terms of the .prevai1ing immigration
system. Hence, because the system was outdated by the progression of both
world and domestic events, the Immigration Act of 1965 was adopted.
It is important to note that while the changes enacted in 1965 signif-
icant1y changed the character of the existing system, the reform movement
7~9uld not entirely escape the heavy hand of the past. Thus, while overt
racism was eliminated in 1965, the new act elevated family reunification to
the role of being the dominant admission factor. On the surface this might
§~em to be a humane featu.re but the motivation for the change was far for
1e~s noble. It was made in the judiciary committee of the House
af Representatives where some congressional supporters were more concerned
with finding a way to retain the national origins system under a covert guise.
Obviously, if certain groups had been excluded or had a low quota in the past
they would have had fewer chances to have relatives who could use their
presence as a means to admit new immigrants. Thus, reliance on family uni-
fication would largely benefit those groups who had large quotas under the
older system. The Johnson Administration opposed this move. It had sought to
retain both the priority and the emphasis of labor market considerations as
the highest preference criterion (which had been the case since the use of
a preference system to determine immigrant priorities was formally established
in 1952). Congress, however, made f~mily reunification the dominant admission
factor. The Johnson Administration was forced to accept the change as the
price of getting rid of the national origins admission system. Labor market
considerations were downgraded to both lower preferences and to a sharply
reduced numberof visa allotments. . The ostensible reasrins for the reversal
or priorities was that during the era when labor market factors dominated the
system had not used al' of the available slots. But as already noted, the
reason for the inability to use all of the available slots between 1952-65
was the distortion of the available pool imposed by the "national origins
$Y$tem" ..n_~t the concept of labor force priority itself.
8In the years since 1965t ther£ have been a number of minor changes in
the immigration system but they have retained this focus. on family reuni-
fication. The system as of early 1984 sets a single world wide admission
ceiling of 270tOOOvisas to be issued each year. No more than 20tOOOvisas
are to be allotted to the would-be immigrants of anyone country. The
lIimmediate re1ativesll of each visa ho1dert hawevert are not counted in
either ceiling. Immediate relatives are spouses, chi1drent and parents of
U.S. citizens over age 21. To decide which specific individuals are to be
granted such a visa within the framework of these numerical cei1ingst a
six category preference system exists. The categories rank the preferences
in order with a certain proportion of the total visas reserved for each
preference. Four of the categories (which account for 80 percent of the
visas) are reserved for persons who are family related. Thust family re-
unification has since 1965 become the mainstay of the legal immigration
system. The two remaining admission categories (which allocate only 20 per-
cent of the available visas each year) are based on labor market principles.
For these two labor market categoriest a person must secure a certification
from the Department of labor that states that the presence of the immigrant
will not adversely effect the job opportunities and prevailing labor force
standards of citizen workers. The overwhelming dominance of family reuni-
fication as the guideline for admissions does not mean that there are no
human resource considerations associated with the o~eration of this system.
It means, rather, that the resulting influences on the. labor market are
largely the result of chance rather than of direction.
In addition to the preference categories, Congress has established 33
separate classes of people who are specifically excluded from being admitted
9(e.g., paupers, prostitutes, Nazis, communists, facists, homosexuals, etc.)
no matter if they would otherwise be eligible to be an immigrant. The pre-
occupation with detailed attempts to regulate the political and social
characteristics of immigrants contrasts sharply with the marked indifference
manifested by Congress toward the economic characteristics of those
admitted to this country.
Refugee and Asylee Policy
It should also be noted that between 1965 and 1980, a separate preference
group existed for refugees with 17,400 slots. Over that interval, however,
the actual number of refugee admissions greatly exceeded this ceiling by
several multiples. The excesses occurred through the use of the parole
authority given to the Attorney General to admit persons for "emergent reasons. II
Because the use of the parole powers was finallj admitted to be what it was --
a means of circumventing the existing immigration statutes, refugees were
removed from the established immigration system in 1980. With the Refugee
Act of 1980, they are admitted under a separate procedure. Since 1982, the
President arbitrarily sets the number of refugees to be admitted in advance
of each fiscal year. He then must consult with Congress over the appropriate-
ness of the suggested figure. The number of refugees approved for Fiscal
Year 1985, for instance, is 70,000 persons (which incidently is the lowest
figure since this procedure began). Obviously, there are no labor market
considerations applied to the entry eligibility refugees.
The Refugee Act of 1980 also created an asylee policy for the United
States. As opposed to a refugee (who is a person living outside of his or
her home nation and who fears persecution if forced to return but who is
not presently in the United States), an asylee is a person who also fears
10
similar persecution if he or she returns to his or her homeland but is already
physically present in the United States. It authorized up to 5,000 asylee
admissions a year on a case-by-case decision basis. As of 1984, however,
there were over 173,000 asylee requests pending approval. The majority of
these persons fled Cuba during the Mariel boat life era of 1980. In 1ate
1984, the Reagan Administration announced that it would permit 125,000 Cubans
in this category to adjust their status to become legal immigrants under a
revised interpretation of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.9 Although this
expedient decision was one way to reduce the size of the pending backlog of
applications, it does nothing to address the fundamental flaws in this policy
that have allowed these numbers to accumulate nor does "it provide any real
guidance over what should be done in the future. In no instance have labor
market considerations been incorporated in the decision making process. But,
as in the case of Cubans who are concentrated in South Florida, it is certain
that this administrative decision will have a significant local economic im-
pact. For not only is the numQer of people directly involved large, but also
because it immediately means that several hundred thousand additional persons
still in Cuba may subsequently be entitled to be admitted on the basis of
10being immediate family members of these former asylees.
Illegal Immigration
Havi ng discussed the "front door" approaches to the na t ion's 1abor market,
it is necessary to add that there is also a massive IIback door II approach as
well. Although the legal system is extremely complex in its objectives, the
entire system can be easily circumvented by those who enter illegally. Unlike
most other nations, there are no penalties on employers who hire illegal
immigrants in the United States. Virtually all illegal immigrants who are
11
caught are given a "vo1untary departure" back to their homeland. Hence, there
is virtually no deterrence associated with the violation of the existing
system. There is no system of work permits or of national identification and
those forms of identification that are available as easily counterfeitab1e.
Moreover, the INS has always been chronically understaffed and underfunded
relative to the enforcement duties it is assigned. All evidence indicates
that most illegal immigrants come to the United States to find jobs -- not
for purposes of securing welfare or for criminal purposes. No one, of course,
knows the exact number of illegal immigrants w~o compose the stock of the
illegal immigrant population or the annual flow. In its final report in 1981,
the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy cited a range of from
3.5 to 6 million illegal immigrants. Their estimate, however, was based upon
a review provided by the Census Bureau of a variety of previous studies done
in the early and mid-1970s. Thus, whatever the validity of the estimate
included in the Select Commission's report, it should be understood that it
was based on the .averaging of data for the mid-1970s -- not the mid-1980s.
Given the certainty that illegal immigratiDn has increased substantially
since the mid-1970s, the stock and flows are certainly greater in the mid-1980s
than those cited by the Commission's Report. In F.Y. 1984, the INS appre-
hended 1,056,905 illegal immigrants. Many of these people were apprehended
more than once. But, on the otherhand, most illegal immigrants -- especially
those from countries other than Mexico -- are never caught. Hence, the precise
magnitude of the stock and annual flows of illegal immigrants cannot be
estimated with any degree of accuracy. No one doubts, however, that their
numbers are substantial and growing. Accordingly, it is highly probable that
12
they influence employment opportunlties and wage levels in the local labor
market in which they congregate.
Labor Market Consequences of the Era
of Renewed Immigration
There is a paucity of credible research on the precise employment ex-
periences of all groups of post-1965 immigrants. There is no statistical
data base to measure the labor force status of immigrants comparable to the
information compiled by the monthly Current Population Survey for all workers
in the United States. All that are available are administrative statistics;
the findings of a few ad hoc studies of immigrants, and information on the
foreign born population supplied by the decenial census count. From these
disparate sources, however, it is possible to discern some likely tendencies.
An awareness of these tendencies and their logical conclusions is prerequisite
to an understanding the macro-economic effects of immigration to the nation.
The Annual Immigrant Infusion to the Supply of Labor Has Increased
Since 1965, the annual !low of legal immigra~ts and their immediate
r~latives, as well as those persons who had been previously admitted for other
reasons and who subsequently were permitted to adjust their status to become
immigrants, has more than doubled the annual flow that existed for the period
1924 to 1965. For the €arlier period, the annual total flow was 191,000 immi-
grants; for the period 1965 to 1981, the number has increased to an annual
average of 435,000 immigrants; for the years 1978 to 1981, it was 547,000
immigrants. These figures do not include those refugees who have yet to
adjust their status to become resident aliens, or those asylees whose status
is sti 11 pendi ng, or any i 11ega1 immigrants. If all flows are considered,
it is likely that immigration in the 1980s is accounting for as much as
13
one-third to one-half of the annual growth in the population and of the real
growth of the labor force.ll
The Size of the Annual Flow of Immigrants Has No regard for Domestic Labor
Market Conditions
The aggregate number of immigrants and immediate relatives admitted each
year is completely indepdendent of the prevailing labor market conditions.
The number of immigrants annually admitted has in no way been influenced by
the tightness or looseness (i.e., the levels of aggregate unemployment) of
the domestic labor market. If allowance is also made for refugees admitted
since 1965 and for the tide of illegal immigrants that have entered over this
period, immigration has steadily added substantial numbers of additional
workers regardless of the cyclical ability of the economy to provide suf-
ficient jobs for citizen or immigrant workers. This practice is at total
variance with the practice of most of the handful of other countries that
have been admitting immigrants over this same period.
Immigrants Have A Higher La~or Force Participation Rate
The few studies that have focused upon labor force participation of
immigrants reveal that the majority of immigrants over age 16 do enter the
labor force. Indeed, they show that the actual labor force participation
rate for legal immigrants and their immediate relative is likely to be con-
1 t . 12siderably -- not marginally -- higher than that of the general popu a lon.
There is no such data, of course, for illegal immigrants but it is in-
tuitively obvious that their labor force participation rates are higher than
those of legal immigrants. Illegal immigrants are primarily job seekers.
They are legislatively ineligible for many of the transfer programs that
might provide alternative income sources. The case with refugees, however,
14
its not quite so clear. Refugees prior to the 1970s seem to have had a
relatively easier adjustment process to labor force entry than have large
infusions of refugees from Southeast Asia that have occurred since the mid-
1970s. Refugees have been eligible not only for federal income transfer
programs but also for local and state programs that are available to needy
citizens.
Immigration Supplies Workers With Only Minimal Regard for the Human Resource
Needs of the Economy.
For the overwhelming proportion of those persons who have immigrated to
the United States, they have been admitted without regard to their skill,
education, or geographic settlement preferences. As noted earlier, 80 percent
of the persons who receive visas to immigrate are admitted because the immi-
gration system gives preference to family reunification principles. Immediate
relatives of all immigrants are admitted regardless of their labor force
credentials as are all refugees and asyless. This is not meant to imply that
those who are admitted under these procedures lack talents but, rather as North
and LeBel have observed, they lido so accidently.1I13 Accordingly it is estimated
that only about 5 percent of all those persons admitted to the United States
each year are required to have labor certifications that indicate they are
filling established labor force needs. If illegal immigrants are added, of
course, this small percentage of certified workers would be reduced to an
infinitesimal amount if compared to the total flow of immigrant workers.
The Immigrant Flow is Predominately Composed of Members of Minority Groups
The most important qualitative change in the personal characteristics
of immigrants that has occurred since the end of the national origins system,
has been the complete shift in the regions of origin of the immigrants. Almost
15
80 percent of the immigrants and refugees admitted during the 1970s were from
Latin America and Asia. In the 1980s, the percentage is even higher (close
to 84 percen~. Beginning with the decade of the 1960s, Europe was replaced
for the first time in the nation's history by Latin America as the leading
source of immigrants. By the 1970s, Asia which was now free from the dis-
criminatory features of the previous immigration system, was challenging
Latin America for that distinction.
The last time that a European nation was among the top five of the
countries that supply immigrants to the United States was in 1973 (when Italy
placed fifth). Mexico has become the country that annually supplies the most
immigrants; the Philippine Islands have tended to be the runner-up. The
other sources vary from year to year but, since 1974, they have all been
located in either Asia or the Caribbean area.
The predominance of immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean
area can be easily explained in terms of the priority given to family re-
unification in the admissions $ystem. For Asians~ the explanation is more
complex. It would seem that the family reunification system should have
worked against many Asian groups, given the exclusionary features that were
in effect for much of the pre-1965 era. The answer to this paradox in the
fact that Asians have made astute use of the occupational preferences as well
as the fact that they have overwhelmingly dominated the massive refugee flows
for each year since the mid-1970s. In the first case, the Asian immigrants
have tended to be highly skilled and educated; in the Asian refugee case,
they have usually been unskilled and poorly educated.
Likewise, the illegal immigrant flows have also come predominately from
Mexico and the Caribbean Area. The best approximations are that about 60
16
percent of the illegal immigrants to the United States come from Mexico; about
20 percent come from other countries of the Caribbean area; and the remaining
20 percent come from other nations of the world.14
Without doubt, therefore, the combined immigrant flows are overwhelmingly
composed of persons from minority groups (Hispanics, blacks, and Asians). As
will be discussed later, there is a strong c1ustering pattern of these immi-
grants into local labor markets of the central cities of a few large states
that are already composed of persons from similar racial and ethnic backgrounds.
As a result, it is very likely that many immigrants compete directly with
other citizen minority workers for available jobs. The competition is
likely to be most adverse in the lower skilled occupations. For the higher
skilled "legal immigrants, the competition for employment opportunities is
more broadly based and, accordingly, the impact is less pronounced.
It is likely, therefore, that since 1965 immigration in general -- but
illegal immigration and refugee flows in particular -- has tended to adversely
affect the employment, unemployment .and labor force participation experiences of
minority citizens in a selected number of urban communities. The geographical
concentration of immigrants in a few large metropolitan areas has also tended
to moderate wage increases for all workers who compete with them in these
t . 1 15same labor markets in general but with minority group citizens in par lCU ar.
To the degree this has happened, uncontrolled immigration has worked at cross
purposes with other federal human resource policies that have been initiated
over these same years that have been designed principally to improve the
econonlic opportunity for these same minority citizen groups.
17
The Occupational Patterns of Immigrants Differ Extensively From Those of the
Labor Force As a Whole
With specific reference to the occupational patterns of immigrants, the
occupational distribution of those admitted as legal immigrants is skewed
toward professional, technical, and skilled workers. The pattern is due
largely to the fact that the complex admission system is biased toward those
who have family connections as well as the time and the money that it takes
to work their way through the labyrinth of the legal immigration system. For
the minority who are admitted under the two occupational preferences and who,
by virtual definition do not have family relatives who are citizens, the two
occupational preferences generally favor those with high skills and extensive
educational backgrounds. Persons who are likely to become "public charges",
for instance, are specifically excluded from becoming legal immigrants. Further-
more, because of the extensive backlog of visa applications (over 1.2 million
visa applications were pending at the end of 1982), there have been no visas
available since 1978 for the non-preference "catch all" category that theo-
retically exists. Thus, it is not surpri~ing that the occupational character-
istics are skewed differently from the distribution of the labor force as a
whole.
It appears from s~udies by David North of a cohort of 1970 immigrants
and a study by Barry Chiswick of the foreign born who entered the U.S. up
to 1970, that the earnings of immigrants tends to be initially below those
of citizen workers in comparable occupations but that these differences
gradually vanish in 11 to 15 years.16 Chiswick, in fact, found that male
immigrants actually end up doing better than citizen workers in comparable
occupations after about 20 years in the country. He was unable to make
18
conclusive findings about female immigrants. It is of consequence to note
that Chiswick found that immigrants from Mexico and the Philippines (the two
countries that have been the largest sources of legal immigrants since 1962)
were the least likely to sustain these favorable results.
In reviewing, Chiswick's ambitious research on this subject, it is vital
to keep in mind that his analysis is of all foreign-born who had entered the
United States prior to 1970. It has been after 1970, however, that the
full effects of the Immigration Act of 1965 and the Refugee Act of 1980 have
occurred. As North has noted, the 1970 census data on the foreign-born "is
a group composed of persons of above average age, most of whomcame to the
U.S. many years earlier and under provisions of earlier legislation. Ill? As
a consequence he specifically warns about the use of this data as a reference
group since "one must not assume that the profile of the foreign-born which
emerged from the 1970 Census will be similar to that emerging from the 1980
or 1990 censuses. 1118
Likewise, the sizeable increases in the number of illegal immigrants --
since the 1960s -- especially those from Mexico and the Caribbean Basin --
have been dominated by low and unskilled workers which also challenge any
complacent deductions that would seem to be the logical conclusions of some
of the existing literature. In Chiswick's work, for instance, there is no
way to separate the experience of legal immigrants from illegal immigrants
since he is studying the foreign born as reported by the Census. It is
certain that the illegal immigrant population is severel~ undercounted in
the Census and, accordingly, it is likely that their experiences are not
adequately captured by this data base.
One study that has made use of the 1980 Census and its data on the
forei gn born was done by Gregory DeFreitas and Adriana f1arsha11 found that
19
over one-third of all immigrants were employed in manufacturing (compared to
23 percent of native born workers.)19 In many metropolitan areas, the con-
centration was more severe -- 75 percent of all manufacturing workers in Miami
were immigrants; over 40 percent of those in Los Angeles and New York City;
25 percent in San Francisco; and 20 percent in Chicago and Boston. In 35
metropolitan areas with a population of one million or more immigrants
comprised 19 percent of all production jobs in manufacturing. Not surpris-
ingly, given the occupational, industrial and geographic concentration of the
immigrant work force, the study found that the.rate of wage growth in manu-
facturing was inversely related to the size of the immigrant population in
those metropolitan areas. The high concentration of foreign born workers
had a statistically significant negative impact on wage growth compared to
the experience with large metropolitan areas with lower percentages of foreign
born workers.
Douglas Massey, however, has warned that these findings may be "an arti-
fact of the level of aggregation" of the data used by these scholars.20 In-
deed, George Borjas has found in a study using data from the 1970 and 1980
Public Use Samples of the U.S. Census that there was no impact of male
immigrants on the earnings of native born males but there was a negative
impact of female immigrants on native born women.2l The model used by Borjas
to reach his conclusions however, has been sharply criticized by Michael
1 . d 22Piore as being totally inappropriate for the use to which it was app le .
Hence, as with most issues in this area of debate, the final verdict is still
out. But, to the degree that simple logic is permitted to substitute when
it is acknowledged that gross data deficiencies exist which limit the utility
20
of even correctly specified econometric models, the concentration of immi-
grants in selected industries and geographic areas strongly supports the
findings of DeFritas and Marshall.
Given that the illegal immigrant flows into the labor force since 1965
are likely to have matched and probably exceeded the legal flows, it is es-
sential that the labor market experiences of'il1ega1 immigrants be specifically
included in any effort to assess the overall impact of immigrants on the labor
market. This means that studies which simply using census data -- with its
acknowledged undercount of illegal immigrants are never going to adequately
capture the true impact of contemporary immigration flows on employment and
earnings. There are only two studies that have been able to make a serious
attempt to capture explicitly some measure of the influence of illegal
immigrants. One was a nationwide study made of apprehended illegal immi-
grants by David North and Marion Houstoun in 1976.23 The second was a study
made of unapprehended illegal immigrants in Los Angeles in 1979 by a research
team from the Unlversity of California at Los Angeles (UCLA).24 Both studies
were funded by the U.S. Department of Labor. In the North and Houstoun study,
the respondents had been in the United States for an average of 2.5 years
while in the UCLA stud~ the mean was 4.0 years.
The occupational patterns ?f the respondents in the two studies showed
conclusively that illegal immigrants are concentrated in the unskilled oc-
cupations of farm workers, service workers, non-farm laborers as well as the
semi-skilled blue collar occupations of operatives. A significant number are
also in the skilled blue collar occupation of craft workers.
found in any white collar occupation.
Very few were
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A comparison of the data from these two studies shows that the OCCIJ-
pational patterns of illegal immigrants closely resembles those of Mexican
Americans (Chicanos) and of blacks. The employment pattern of Chicanos, in
fact, better resembles the pattern of illegal immigrants than it does the
general distribution pattern of the labor force.
It seems certain that the illegal immigrant workers are concentrated
in the secondary labor market of the U.S. economy where they often compete
with the millions of citizen workers who also work and seek-work in this
sector. Indeed, Malcolm Lovell, the Under Secretary of Labor in his testimony
to Congress in support of immigration reform stated that "in 1981, close to
30 percent of all workers employed in this country, some 29 million people,
were holding down the same kind of low-skilled industrial, service, and farm
jobs in which illegals typically find emp10yment.1I25
Illegal immigrants are by no means the only cause of unemployment and
persistent low income patterns among certain sub-groups of the American labor
force but they certainly are ~ factor. The formulation of any serious full
employment strategy for the United States 'in the 1980s, therefore, will have
to include measures to curtail illegal immigration.
Thus, it would appear that the occupational impact of legal immigrants
.
is at the upper end of the nation'~occupationa1 structure while the impact
of illegal immigrants is at the lower end. Studies that combine these two
groups -- such as those that rely exclusively on Census data -- to obtain an
average measure of the experience of immigrants on the labor force miss the
actual significance of the real impacts which appear to be concentrated on
the extreme ends of the occupational spectrum.
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The Locational Impact of Immigrants Is Extremely Unequal
One of the most pronounced effects of the unguided immigration system
is that legal immigrants are highly concentrated into a relatively few but
still major labor markets. Since 1966, California and New York have con-
sistently accounted for almost half of the intended residences of all legal
immigrants. Texas, Florida, NewJersey and }llinois account for about one
quarter of the remainder. Thus, six states have received almost three-
quarters of all of the legal immigrants. Data from the 1980 Census also
confirm this high concentration rate of the total foreign born population in
the same states (the percentage of foreign born in California was 14.8 percent,
NewYork 13.4 percent, NewJersey 10.3, Florida 10.9, Illinois 7.3 and Texas
6.0; the only other state with a large foreign born population was Hawaii
with 14.0 percent}.26
Within the states in which they settle, legal immigrants have demon-
strated a consistent preference in the 1970s for the large central cities.27
Although the exact percentages varie? each year, a central city was the
destination of about 55 percent of the immigrants who were admitted between
1960 and 1979. Urban areas -- those with a population of between 2,500 to
99,000 people -- were the clear second choices while rural areas were a
distant last.
.
These initial residential patterns differ distinctly from
those of the general population in which urban areas have become the over-
whelming first choice since 1960 (accounting for almost half of the population)
followed by an almost equal preference (of about'25 percent each) for central
cities and rural areas.
The Census information on the foreign born population in 1980 vividly
demonstrates the effect that immigration is having on the population of a
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few large metropolitan areas. In 1980t for instancet the metropolitan area
with the highest percentage of its population being foreign born was Miamit
Florida with a phenomenal percentage of 35.2 percent. The second highest
was Los Angelest California (21.6 percent) and the third was New York City
(20.8) percent). Thus, the necessity to accommodate the growing immigrant
flow has not fallen evenly. Only a few states and a handful of cities have
borne the brunt of the revival of immigration that has occurred since 1965.
As the aforementioned DeFreitas and Marshall study foundt one effect of
these disproportinate concentrations has been to retard wage growth in these
large metropolitan areas relative to other metropolitan areas with fewer
immigrant workers. It is also of consequence tq note that the settlement
pattern of illegal immigrants has closely resembled the locational preferences
of legal immigrants. In their quest to avoid detectiont illegal immigrants
often seek to blend into communities that already have large numbers of
persons from similar ethnic backgrounds~ This tendencYt of courset only
intensifies the pressures on these few states and cities to accommodate
immigrants.
Thust the uneven distribution of immigrants means that studies that
focus on the national or state level miss the actual impact of immigration
at the local level in the communities of only a handful of states. But when
one recognizes that those central cities in these few states account for a
significant portion of the total employment in the nation and especially the
employment opportunities available for minority group workers, there is no
reason to consider these impacts as inconsequential.
In The Short Run, It is Likely That Immigrants Contribute to Higher Unemployment
Rates
Chiswick has found for the foreign born males that it takes about five
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years for them to reach the same number of weeks worked and to come'down to
the same number of weeks of unemployment as native born men.28 This would
suggest that in the short run that immigrant males tend to experience a higher
incidence of unemployment than is the general case. In his findings, it is
also important to note that he found that the foreign born males from Mexico,
Cuba, and China tended to take longer to reach parity with native born men
than it did the foreign born men from other natio~s. With respect to their
unemployment experience,all three of these countries have consistently ranked
among the largest sources of immigrants and refugees since 1970. It is logical
to conclude that, if anything, the unemployment experiences of immigrants over
the past decade should be less favorable than those that occurred prior to
the 1970s.
'Concluding Observations
The prevailing immigration policy of the U~ited States was largely con-
ceived in the early 1950s and the mid-1960s when immigration was not a signi-
ficant influence on the economy. As a result, the policies that have led to
the consequences outlined in this paper manifest a complete disinterest in
their labor force implications. Perhaps the nation could tolerate such
permissiveness if the immigration flows of workers had remained relatively
small and if the economy had not undergone significant structural changes.
But such is not the case. Hence, the IIpracticell of allowing immigration
policy to continue to follow its own nepotistic, inflexible, mechanistic,
and massively abused course is a IIluxuryll that this nation can ill afford
to continue.
The economy of the United States in the mid-1980s is a far cry from the
one into which earlier waves of immigrants entered. The resurgence of
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immigration since 1965 has paralle~led a period when the labor force of the
United States has sustained unprecedented changes in both size and composition.
With regard to size, the civilian labor force increased by an average of
1.8 million workers each year from 1964 to 1973; and annually by 2.2 million
from 1973 to 1980. Since then the rate of annual increase -- as officially
measured (which means that it is doubtful if -the full effects of growing
numbers of illegal immigrants are included) -- has declined slightly. None-
the1ess, in 1984 the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) announced that it is
revising its long term projections of labor force growth from the period 1982
to 1990 to 1.6 million net new workers each year. (I would argue that even
this projection is conservative -- ~ all past projections Qy BLS have been).
As for the composition of the labor force, the years since 1965 have
been a period one in which racial and ethnic groups as well as womenhave
dramatically increased their proportions of the total labor force. The
BLS projects that these patterns will continue -- with women accounting for
two-thirds of the annual growt~ in the labor force and blacks about 25 percent
over the next decade. It is certain ~- especially if immigration continues
the pattern of the past -- that the Hispanic labor force will also increase
its share disproportionately even though the BLSdid not highlight this
.
group in its projections.
With respect to the entire labor force, the next decade presents the
nation with a unique situation. Because the "baby boom" generation has now
come of age, it is projected that by 1990 the largest single age cohort of
the population will be between the ages of 25 to 44 -- the prime working age
years. It is a period when labor force participation is at its highest for
both males and females. During the late 1980s and early 1990s it is predicted
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that there will be more persons in" the labor force than not -- including
babies. By 1995, it is expected that 70 percent of the labor force will be
between 25 and 54 years of age. Thus, it is going to be a time in which
there will be mounting pressure on the economy to generate additional emp1oy-
ment opportunities -- especially for womenand minorities.
Under these circumstances, it is clear fhat the last two decades of
the Twentieth Century are going to be years in which the labor force of the
nation will be confronted with immense pressures to accommodate both the
growth in the number of jObs seekers as well as to significant changes in the
racial and gender composition of the supply of labor. The quest to meet these
challenges will be difficult enough without being undermined by an immigration
policy that is oblivious to its labor market impacts but which, in actuality,
has influential labor market consequences.
The broad outlines of the policy reform needed to make immigration policy
conform to the economic welfare of the nation are easy to list. With respect
to the annual levels of immigration, there need to be enforceable ceilings.
But they should be ceilings and not established and inflexible numbers. The
actual number of immigrants admitted each year should be responsive to unemp1oy-
ment trends ih the nation. Annual immigration levels should fluctuate in-
verse1y with unemployment trends (as "is the practice in Canada). The system
should be capable of responding to changing economic circumstances. The
boundary ceiling should be ~et by legislation but the precise levels in any
given year should be set administratively. It is implicit if this were to
be done, that the administrative responsibilities for immigration policy
should be shifted back to the U.S. Department of Labor (or some other new
agency that might be created to administer and coordinate all of the nation's
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human resource development policies) and away from the U.S. Department of
Justice and the judiciary committees of Congress.
As regard to the actual determination of who is admitted as a legal
immigrant each year, the preference system should revert back to the primary
emphasis on occupational preferences that characterized the preference system
from 1952 to 1965. Family reunification should remain an admission criterion
but not the primary factor as has been the case since 1965. No other nation
in the world allows such a nepotistic and discriminatory doctrine to dominate
its admission system. The occupational preferences should be increased to
at least the pre-1965 level of 50 percent of the available visas. Full
discretion should be given to the administrative agency to decide which oc-
cupations (skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled) are in greatest need at any
'particular time and to admit them. Included within this discretionary power
should be the right to give preference to immigrants willing to settle in
regions where there is scarcity of labor with certain skills. The shift
away from the dominance of fami.ly reunification would also allow opportunities
for IInew seed immigrantsll (especially for immigrants from Africa which have
the most trouble entering under the existing system).
The refugee and asylee policies of the nation are the most difficult to
integrate into a policy design that focuses on economic priorities. Obviously,
the United States should continue to participate in the world wide effort
to absorb and to assist in ~he accommodation of refugees. But experience
clearly indicates that there must be limitations on the number of refugees
admitted and where they settle. A legislative ceiling should be set on the
number of refugees to be admitted with the understanding that, if special
circumstances do arise, more refugees may be admitted but that offsetting
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reductions will be made in the number of legal immigrants in the same or the
following year. If a situation should develop that was truly extraordinary,
Congress could legislate a temporary increase in the numerical boundaries
to accommodate such a unique circumstance. The asylee issue is presently
too complex to discuss in this paper except to note that the current policy
is hopelessly bogged down in a system of judicial paralysis. Currently,
asylees are entitled to more levels of appeals of their status than are provided
to convicted felons. It is essential that a more expedited system of reaching
closure in these cases be designed. But the ultimate principle for admission
should be the same as refugees: namely, if asylees permissions are granted,
legal immigration should be reduced accordingly. It is essential that the
principle of choice be firmly established in the operation of the nation's
immigration system. Otherwise, one is confronted with the chaos of the present
system where the policy is essentially one that ratifies what has already
happened anyway. Moreover, there is no sense establishing the concept that
total immigrant flows should flunctuate with domestic labor market conditions
if the entire process can be circumvented by flows.from another source. There
are already ample signs that the refugee and asylee system is being used for
purposesothetthan those for which it was designed -- to avoid persecution
for one's political and personal views. The full cost of assisting refugees
and asylees to be prepared from entry into the labor market should be borne
by the federal government and not by local communities where they congregate.
All of the preceding suggestions, of course, are predicated on the
assumption that a full-scale effort will be mounted to end the flow of illegal
immigrants into the country. It would make no sense at all to attempt to
construct a positive immigration policy that works in tandum with general
29
economic policy if the entire process can be easily circumvented. The ap-
propriate policies should be designed to address both the "push" and the
"pull" factors that contribute to the illegal immigration process. They
should include enhanced deterrent policies (e.g., employer sanctions, en-
hanced INS funding, and less reliance on the use of the voluntary departure
system) as well as prevention measures (e.g.; extensive economic and tech-
nical development assistance, trade and tariff concessions, and the absolute
insistance on the adherence to human rights principles and the protection
of human life from murder and torture as a prerequisite for receipt of the
economic aid and trade concessions).
The absence of any serious effort to forge an immigration policy based
upon labor market considerations means that immigration policy today functions
as a "wild card" among the nation's array of key labor market policies. Un-
like all other elements of economic policy (e.g., fiscal policy, monetary
policy, employment and training policy, education policy, and anti-discrim-
ination policy) where attempts are made by pOlicymakers to orchestrate these
diverse policy elements into a harmony of action, immigration policy has been
allowed to meander aimlessly.
can allow to continue.
This is a situation that no sensible nation
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